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Abstract
The family of Groves mechanisms, which includes the well-known VCG mechanism (also
known as the Clarke mechanism), is a family of efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms. Unfortu-
nately, the Groves mechanisms are generally not budget balanced. That is, under such mechanisms,
payments may flow into or out of the system of the agents, resulting in deficits or reduced utilities
for the agents. We consider the following problem: within the family of Groves mechanisms, we
want to identify mechanisms that give the agents the highest utilities, under the constraint that these
mechanisms must never incur deficits.
We adopt a prior-free approach. We introduce two general measures for comparing mecha-
nisms in prior-free settings. We say that a non-deficit Groves mechanismM individually dominates
another non-deficit Groves mechanismM ′ if for every type profile, every agent’s utility underM is
no less than that under M ′, and this holds with strict inequality for at least one type profile and one
agent. We say that a non-deficit Groves mechanism M collectively dominates another non-deficit
Groves mechanism M ′ if for every type profile, the agents’ total utility under M is no less than
that under M ′, and this holds with strict inequality for at least one type profile. The above defini-
tions induce two partial orders on non-deficit Groves mechanisms. We study the maximal elements
corresponding to these two partial orders, which we call the individually undominated mechanisms
and the collectively undominated mechanisms, respectively.
1. Introduction
Mechanism design is often employed for coordinating group decision making among agents. Of-
ten, such mechanisms impose payments that agents have to pay to a central authority. Although
maximizing revenue is a desirable objective in many settings (for example, if the mechanism is an
auction designed by the seller), it is not desirable in situations where no entity is profiting from the
payments. Some examples include public project problems as well as certain resource allocation
problems without a seller (e.g., the right to use a shared good in a given time slot, or the assign-
ment of take-off slots among airline companies). In such cases, we would like to have mechanisms
that minimize payments (or, even better, achieve budget balance), while maintaining other desirable
properties, such as being efficient, strategy-proof and non-deficit (i.e., the mechanism does not need
to be funded by an external source).
. Some of this work appeared in preliminary form in (Apt, Conitzer, Guo, & Markakis, 2008) and (Guo & Conitzer,
2008b).
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The family of Groves mechanisms, which includes the well-known VCG mechanism (also
known as the Clarke mechanism), is a family of efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms. In many
sufficiently general settings, including the settings that we will study in this paper, the Groves mech-
anisms are the only efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms (Holmstro¨m, 1979). Unfortunately
though, the Groves mechanisms are generally not budget balanced. That is, under such mecha-
nisms, payments may flow into or out of the system of the agents, resulting in deficits or reduced
utilities for the agents. Motivated by this we consider in this paper the following problem: within
the family of Groves mechanisms, we want to identify mechanisms that give the agents the highest
utilities, under the constraint that these mechanisms never incur deficits.1
We adopt a prior-free approach, where each agent i knows only his own valuation vi, and there
is no prior probability distribution over the other agents’ values. We introduce two natural measures
for comparing mechanisms in prior-free settings. Given a performance indicator, we say that mech-
anism M individually dominates mechanism M ′ if for every type profile of the agents, M performs
no worse than M ′ from the perspective of each individual agent, and this holds with strict inequality
for at least one type profile and one agent. We say that mechanism M collectively dominates mech-
anism M ′ if for every type profile, M performs no worse than M ′ from the perspective of the set
of agents as a whole, and this holds with strict inequality for at least one type profile. In this paper,
we focus on maximizing the agents’ utilities. Given this specific performance indicator, individual
and collective dominance are determined by comparing either individual utilities or the sum of the
agents’ utilities, respectively.
The above definitions induce two partial orders on non-deficit Groves mechanisms. Our goal in
this work is to identify and study the maximal elements corresponding to these two partial orders,
which we call the individually undominated (non-deficit Groves) mechanisms and the collectively
undominated (non-deficit Groves) mechanisms, respectively. It should be noted that the partial
orders we focus on may be different from the partial orders induced by other performance indicators,
e.g., if the criterion is the revenue extracted from the agents.
1.1 Structure of the paper
The presentation of our results is structured as follows: In Sections 2 and 3, we formally define
the notions of individual and collective dominance, as well as the family of Groves mechanisms,
and then provide some basic observations. We also establish some general properties of anonymous
Groves mechanisms which we use later on, and which may be of independent interest. We then be-
gin our study of individual dominance in Section 4, where we give a characterization of individually
undominated mechanisms. We also propose two techniques for transforming any given non-deficit
Groves mechanism into one that is individually undominated.
In Sections 5 and 6 we study the question of finding collectively undominated mechanisms in
two settings. The first (Section 5) is auctions of multiple identical units with unit-demand bidders.
In this setting, the VCG mechanism is collectively dominated by other non-deficit Groves mecha-
nisms, such as the Bailey-Cavallo mechanism (Bailey, 1997; Cavallo, 2006). We obtain a complete
characterization of collectively undominated mechanisms that are anonymous and linear (meaning
that the redistribution is a linear function of the ordered type profile; see Section 5 for the defini-
1. The agents’ utilities may be further increased if we also consider mechanisms outside of the Groves family (Guo &
Conitzer, 2008a; de Clippel, Naroditskiy, & Greenwald, 2009; Faltings, 2005; Guo, Naroditskiy, Conitzer, Green-
wald, & Jennings, 2011), but in this paper we take efficiency as a hard constraint.
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tion). In particular, we show that the collectively undominated mechanisms that are anonymous
and linear are exactly the Optimal-in-Expectation Linear (OEL) redistribution mechanisms, which
include the Bailey-Cavallo mechanism and were introduced in (Guo & Conitzer, 2010). The second
setting (Section 6) is public project problems, where a set of agents must decide on whether and
how to finance a project (e.g., building a bridge). We show that in the case where the agents have
identical participation costs, the VCG mechanism is collectively undominated. On the other hand,
when the participation costs can be different across agents, there exist mechanisms that collectively
dominate VCG. We finally show that when the participation costs are different across agents, the
VCG mechanism remains collectively undominated among all pay-only mechanisms.
1.2 Related work
How to efficiently allocate resources among a group of competing agents is a well-studied topic
in economics literature. For example, the famous Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem (Myerson &
Satterthwaite, 1983) rules out the existence of efficient, Bayes-Nash incentive compatible, budget-
balanced, and individually rational mechanisms. Cramton et al. (1987) characterized the Bayes-
Nash incentive compatible and individually rational mechanisms for dissolving a partnership, and
gave the necessary and sufficient condition for the possibility of dissolving partnership efficiently.
The main difference between these papers and ours is that we adopt a prior-free approach. That
is, we do not assume that we know the prior distribution of the agents’ valuations. As a result of
this, our notion of truthfulness is strategy-proofness, which is stronger than Bayes-Nash incentive
compatibility. In many sufficiently general settings, including the settings that we will study in this
paper, the Groves mechanisms are the only efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms (Holmstro¨m,
1979). That is, the search of undominated Groves mechanisms is, in many settings, the search of
efficient, strategy-proof, and non-deficit mechanisms that are closest to budget-balance.
Recently, there has been a series of works on VCG redistribution mechanisms, which are mech-
anisms that make social decisions according to the efficient and strategy-proof VCG mechanism,
and then redistribute some of the VCG payments back to the agents, under certain constraints,
such as that an agent’s redistribution should be independent of his own type (therefore ensuring
strategy-proofness), and that the total redistribution should never exceed the total VCG payment
(therefore ensuring non-deficit). Actually, any non-deficit Groves mechanism can be interpreted as
such a VCG-based redistribution mechanism, and any (non-deficit) VCG redistribution mechanism
corresponds to a non-deficit Groves mechanism (more details on this are provided in Section 2).
One example of a redistribution mechanism is the Bailey-Cavallo (BC) mechanism (Cavallo,
2006).2 Under the BC mechanism, every agent, besides participating in the VCG mechanism,
also receives 1
n
times the minimal VCG revenue that could have been obtained by changing this
agent’s own bid. In some settings (e.g., a single-item auction), the BC mechanism can successfully
redistribute a large portion of the VCG payments back to the agents. That is, in such settings, the
BC mechanism both individually and collectively dominates the VCG mechanism.
Guo and Conitzer (Guo & Conitzer, 2009) proposed another VCG redistribution mechanism
called the worst-case optimal (WCO) redistribution mechanism, in the setting of multi-unit auctions
with nonincreasing marginal values. WCO is optimal in terms of the fraction of total VCG pay-
2. In settings that are revenue monotonic, the Cavallo mechanism (Cavallo, 2006) coincides with a mechanism dis-
covered earlier by Bailey (1997). The Bailey-Cavallo mechanism for a single-item auction was also independently
discovered in (Porter, Shoham, & Tennenholtz, 2004).
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ment redistributed in the worst case.3 Moulin (Moulin, 2009) independently derived WCO under
a slightly different worst-case optimality notion (in the more restrictive setting of multi-unit auc-
tions with unit demand only). Guo and Conitzer (Guo & Conitzer, 2010) also proposed a family
of VCG redistribution mechanisms that aim to maximize the expected amount of VCG payment
redistributed, in the setting of multi-unit auctions with unit demand. The members of this family
are called the Optimal-in-Expectation Linear (OEL) redistribution mechanisms.
Finally, the paper that is the closest to what we study here is an early work by Moulin on
collectively undominated non-deficit Groves mechanisms (Moulin, 1986). It deals with the problem
of selecting an efficient public decision out of finitely many costless alternatives.4 Each agent
submits to the central authority his utility for each alternative. Subsequently, the central authority
makes a decision that maximizes the social welfare. Moulin showed (Lemma 2 of Moulin, 1986)
that the VCG mechanism is collectively undominated in the above setting. This result generalizes
an earlier result for the case of two public decisions by Laffont and Maskin (Laffont & Maskin,
1997).
2. Preliminaries
We first briefly review payment-based mechanisms (see, e.g., Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green,
1995).
2.1 Payment-based mechanisms
Assume that there is a set of possible outcomes or decisions D, a set {1, . . ., n} of agents where
n ≥ 2, and for each agent i, a set of types Θi and an (initial) utility function vi : D ×Θi→ R. Let
Θ := Θ1 × · · · ×Θn.
In a (direct revelation) mechanism, each agent reports a type θi ∈ Θi and based on this, the
mechanism selects an outcome and a payment to be made by every agent. Hence a mechanism is
given by a pair of functions (f, t), where f is the decision function and t is the payment function
that determines the agents’ payments, i.e., f : Θ→D, and t : Θ→ Rn.
We put ti(θ) := (t(θ))i, i.e., the function ti computes the payment of agent i. For each vector
θ of announced types, if ti(θ) ≥ 0, agent i pays ti(θ), and if ti(θ) < 0, he receives |ti(θ)|. When
the true type of agent i is θi and his announced type is θ′i, his final utility function is defined by
ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) := vi(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi)− ti(θ
′
i, θ−i),
where θ−i is the vector of types announced by the other agents.
2.2 Properties of payment-based mechanisms
We say that a payment-based mechanism (f, t) is
• efficient if for all θ ∈ Θ and d ∈ D,∑ni=1 vi(f(θ), θi) ≥∑ni=1 vi(d, θi),
• budget-balanced if
∑n
i=1 ti(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ Θ,
3. This notion of worst-case optimality was also studied for more general settings in (Gujar & Narahari, 2011; Guo,
2011, 2012).
4. In our public project model, there is a cost associated with building the project.
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• non-deficit if∑ni=1 ti(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ, i.e., the mechanism does not need to be funded by an
external source,
• pay-only if ti(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ and all i ∈ {1, . . ., n},
• strategy-proof if for all θ, i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, and θ′i,
ui((f, t)(θi, θ−i), θi) ≥ ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi),
i.e., for each agent i, reporting a false type, here θ′i, is not profitable.
2.3 Individual and collective dominance
We consider prior-free settings, where each agent i knows only his own function vi, and there is
no belief or prior probability distribution regarding the other agents’ initial utilities. Payment-based
mechanisms can naturally be compared in terms of either the effect on each individual agent or
the global effect on the whole set of agents. We therefore introduce two measures for comparing
such mechanisms. Given a performance indicator5 , we say that mechanism (f ′, t′) individually
dominates mechanism (f, t) if for every type profile, (f ′, t′) performs no worse than (f, t) from
the perspective of every agent, and this holds with strict inequality for at least one type profile and
one agent. We say that mechanism (f ′, t′) collectively dominates mechanism (f, t) if for every type
profile, (f ′, t′) performs no worse than (f, t) from the perspective of the whole agent system, and
this holds with strict inequality for at least one type profile. In this paper, we focus on maximizing
the agents’ utilities. Given this specific performance indicator, individual and collective dominance
are captured by the following definitions:
Definition 2.1 Given two payment-based mechanisms (f, t) and (f ′, t′), we say that (f ′, t′) indi-
vidually dominates (f, t) if
• for all θ ∈ Θ and all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, ui((f, t)(θ), θi) ≤ ui((f ′, t′)(θ), θi),
• for some θ ∈ Θ and some i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, ui((f, t)(θ), θi) < ui((f ′, t′)(θ), θi).
Definition 2.2 Given two payment-based mechanisms (f, t) and (f ′, t′), we say that (f ′, t′) collec-
tively dominates (f, t) if
• for all θ ∈ Θ,
∑n
i=1 ui((f, t)(θ), θi) ≤
∑n
i=1 ui((f
′, t′)(θ), θi),
• for some θ ∈ Θ,
∑n
i=1 ui((f, t)(θ), θi) <
∑n
i=1 ui((f
′, t′)(θ), θi).
For two payment-based mechanisms (f, t) and (f ′, t′), clearly if (f ′, t′) individually dominates
(f, t), then it also collectively dominates (f, t). Theorem 3.4 shows that the reverse implication
however does not need to hold, even if we limit ourselves to special types of mechanisms. That is,
the fact that (f ′, t′) collectively dominates (f, t) does not imply that (f ′, t′) individually dominates
(f, t).
5. By a performance indicator we mean a function of the mechanism’s outcome that serves as a measure for comparing
mechanisms. E.g., it can be the final utility of an agent, or an arbitrary function of it, or a function of the agent’s
payment or any other function that depends on the decision rule and the payment rule of the mechanism.
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Given a set Z of payment-based mechanisms, individual and collective dominance induce two
partial orders on Z , and we are interested in studying the maximal elements with respect to these
partial orders. A maximal element with respect to the first partial order will be called an individually
undominated mechanism, i.e., it is a mechanism that is not individually dominated by any other
mechanism in Z . A maximal element for the second partial order will be called a collectively
undominated mechanism, i.e., it is a mechanism that is not collectively dominated by any other
mechanism in Z . The maximal elements with respect to the two partial orders may differ and
in particular, the notion of collectively undominated mechanisms is generally a stronger notion.
Clearly, if (f ′, t′) ∈ Z is collectively undominated, then it is also individually undominated. The
reverse may not be true, examples of which are provided in Section 4.2.
If we focus on the same decision function f , then individual and collective dominance are
strictly due to the difference of the payment functions. Hence, (f, t′) individually dominates (f, t)
(or simply t′ individually dominates t) if and only if
• for all θ ∈ Θ and all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, ti(θ) ≥ t′i(θ), and
• for some θ ∈ Θ and some i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, ti(θ) > t′i(θ),
and t′ collectively dominates t if
• for all θ ∈ Θ,
∑n
i=1 ti(θ) ≥
∑n
i=1 t
′
i(θ), and
• for some θ ∈ Θ,
∑n
i=1 ti(θ) >
∑n
i=1 t
′
i(θ).
We now define two transformations on payment-based mechanisms originating from the same
decision function. Both transformations build upon the surplus-guarantee concept (Cavallo, 2006)
for the specific case of the VCG mechanism6.
Consider a payment-based mechanism (f, t). Given θ = (θ1, . . ., θn), let T (θ) be the total
amount of payments, i.e., T (θ) :=
∑n
i=1 ti(θ). For each i ∈ {1, . . ., n} let
SBCGCi (θ−i) := inf
θ′i∈Θi
T (θ′i, θ−i).
In other words, SBCGCi (θ−i) is the surplus guarantee independent of the report of agent i. We then
define the payment-based mechanism (f, tBCGC) by setting for i ∈ {1, . . ., n}
tBCGCi (θ) := ti(θ)−
SBCGCi (θ−i)
n
.
Also, for a fixed agent j, we define the payment-based mechanism (f, tBCGC(j)) by setting for
i ∈ {1, . . ., n}
t
BCGC(j)
i (θ) :=
{
ti(θ)− S
BCGC
i (θ−i) if i = j
ti(θ) if i 6= j
6. The first transformation was originally defined in (Bailey, 1997) and (Cavallo, 2006) for the specific case of the VCG
mechanism and in (Guo & Conitzer, 2008b) for non-deficit Groves mechanisms. We call it the BCGC transformation
after the authors of these papers (Bailey, Cavallo, Guo, Conitzer).
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After the first transformation (from (f, t) to (f, tBCGC)), every agent receives an additional7
amount of 1
n
times the surplus guarantee independent of his own type. During the second trans-
formation (from (f, t) to (f, tBCGC(j)), agent j is chosen to be the only agent who receives an
additional amount. This additional amount equals the entirety of the surplus guarantee indepen-
dent of j’s own type. For both transformations the agents’ additional payments are independent of
their own types, thus the strategy-proofness is maintained: if (f, t) is strategy-proof, then so are
(f, tBCGC) and (f, tBCGC(j)) for all j.
The following observations generalize some of the results of (Bailey, 1997; Cavallo, 2006).
Proposition 2.3
(i) Each payment-based mechanism of the form tBCGC is non-deficit.
(ii) If t is non-deficit, then either t and tBCGC coincide or tBCGC individually (and hence also
collectively) dominates t.
Proof. (i) For all θ and i ∈ {1, . . ., n} we have T (θ) ≥ SBCGCi (θ−i), so
TBCGC(θ) =
n∑
i=1
tBCGCi (θ) = T (θ)−
n∑
i=1
SBCGCi (θ−i)
n
=
n∑
i=1
T (θ)− SBCGCi (θ−i)
n
≥ 0.
(ii) If t is non-deficit, then for all θ and all i ∈ {1, . . ., n} we have SBCGCi (θ−i) ≥ 0, and hence
tBCGCi (θ) ≤ ti(θ). ✷
The same claims hold for tBCGC(j) for j ∈ {1, . . ., n}, with equally simple proofs.
3. Groves mechanisms
We first briefly review Groves mechanisms.
3.1 Preliminaries
Recall that a Groves mechanism (Groves, 1973) is a payment-based mechanism (f, t) such that the
following hold8:
• f(θ) ∈ argmaxd∈D
∑n
i=1 vi(d, θi), i.e., the chosen outcome maximizes the allocation wel-
fare (the agents’ total valuation),
• ti : Θ→ R is defined by ti(θ) := hi(θ−i)− gi(θ), where
• gi(θ) :=
∑
j 6=i vj(f(θ), θj),
• hi : Θ−i→ R is an arbitrary function.
7. Receiving an additional positive amount means paying less and receiving an additional negative amount means paying
more.
8. Here and below
∑
j 6=i is a shorthand for the summation over all j ∈ {1, . . ., n}, j 6= i.
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So gi(θ) represents the allocation welfare from the decision f(θ) with agent i ignored. Recall
now the following crucial result (see, e.g., Mas-Colell et al., 1995).
Groves Theorem (Groves, 1973) Every Groves mechanism is efficient and strategy-proof.
For several decision problems, the only efficient and strategy-proof payment-based mechanisms
are Groves mechanisms. This is implied by a general result of (Holmstro¨m, 1979), which covers the
two domains that we consider in Sections 5 and 6, and explains our focus on Groves mechanisms.
Hence from now on, we use the term “mechanism” to refer to a Groves mechanism.
Focusing on the set of non-deficit Groves mechanisms, individually (respectively, collectively)
undominated mechanisms are the mechanisms from this set that are not individually (respectively,
collectively) dominated by any other non-deficit Groves mechanism. As mentioned earlier, no mat-
ter which domain and which set of mechanisms we consider, collective undominance always im-
plies individual undominance. In Section 4.2 we show two examples of single-item auction scenar-
ios, where collective undominance is strictly stronger than individual undominance, for non-deficit
Groves mechanisms. That is, there exists an individually undominated non-deficit Groves mecha-
nism that is collectively dominated.
Recall that a special Groves mechanism, called the VCG or Clarke mechanism (Clarke, 1971),
is obtained using9
hi(θ−i) := max
d∈D
∑
j 6=i
vj(d, θj).
In this case
ti(θ) := max
d∈D
∑
j 6=i
vj(d, θj)−
∑
j 6=i
vj(f(θ), θj),
which shows that the VCG mechanism is pay-only.
In what follows we introduce a slightly different notation to describe Groves mechanisms, that
makes the rest of our presentation more convenient. First, we denote the payment function ti of
the VCG mechanism by V CGi. Note now that each Groves mechanism (f, t) can be defined in
terms of the VCG mechanism by setting ti(θ) := V CGi(θ) − ri(θ−i), where ri : Θ−i→ R is
some function of θ−i. We refer then to r := (r1, . . ., rn) as a redistribution function. Hence each
Groves mechanism can be identified with a redistribution function r and can be viewed as the VCG
mechanism combined with a redistribution. That is, under r the agents first participate in the VCG
mechanism. Then, on top of that, agent i also receives a redistribution amount equal to ri(θ−i). By
definition, a Groves mechanism r is non-deficit iff
∑n
i=1 V CGi(θ) ≥
∑n
i=1 ri(θ−i) for all θ ∈ Θ.
3.2 Dominance relations
Using the new notation above, individual and collective dominance (among non-deficit Groves
mechanisms) can be described as follows:
Definition 3.1 A non-deficit Groves mechanism r′ individually dominates another non-deficit Groves
mechanism r if
• for all i and all θ, r′i(θ−i) ≥ ri(θ−i),
9. Here and below, whenever D is not a finite set, in order to ensure that the considered maximum exists, we assume
that f is continuous, and so is vi for each i, and also that the set D and all Θi are compact subsets of some Rk.
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• for some i and some θ, r′i(θ−i) > ri(θ−i).
Definition 3.2 A non-deficit Groves mechanism r′ collectively dominates another non-deficit Groves
mechanism r if
• for all θ,
∑
i r
′
i(θ−i) ≥
∑
i ri(θ−i),
• for some θ,
∑
i r
′
i(θ−i) >
∑
i ri(θ−i).
We now consider the mechanism that results from applying the BCGC transformation to the
VCG mechanism. We refer to this as the Bailey-Cavallo mechanism or simply the BC mecha-
nism (Cavallo, 2006). The VCG mechanism is characterized by the constant redistribution function
r
VCG = (0, 0, . . ., 0). After the BCGC transformation, every agent i receives an additional amount
of 1
n
times the surplus guarantee SBCGCi (θ−i), independent of his own type. That is, the BC mech-
anism is also a Groves mechanism, and its redistribution function is rBC =
( 1
n
SBCGC1 ,
1
n
SBCGC2 , . . .,
1
n
SBCGCn ).
Let θ′ := (θ1, . . ., θi−1, θ′i, θi+1, . . ., θn). Then starting from the VCG mechanism, we have
SBCGCi (θ−i) = inf
θ′
i
∈Θi
n∑
k=1

max
d∈D
∑
j 6=k
vj(d, θ
′
j)−
∑
j 6=k
vj(f(θ
′), θ′j)

 ,
that is,
SBCGCi (θ−i) = inf
θ′
i
∈Θi

 n∑
k=1
max
d∈D
∑
j 6=k
vj(d, θ
′
j)− (n− 1)
n∑
k=1
vk(f(θ
′), θ′k)

 (1)
In many settings, we have that for all θ and for all i, SBCGCi (θ−i) = 0, and consequently the
VCG and BC mechanisms coincide (e.g., see Proposition 6.1). Whenever they do not, by Proposi-
tion 2.3(ii), BC individually and collectively dominates VCG. This is the case for the single-item
auction, as it can be seen that there SBCGCi (θ−i) = [θ−i]2, where [θ−i]2 is the second-highest bid
among bids other than agent i’s own bid.
3.3 Anonymous Groves mechanisms
Some of the proofs of our main results are obtained by arguing first about a special class of Groves
mechanisms, called anonymous Groves mechanisms. We provide here some results about this class
that we will utilize in later sections. We call a function f : An →B permutation independent if for
all permutations π of {1, . . ., n}, f = f ◦π. Following (Moulin, 1986), we call a Groves mechanism
r = (r1, . . ., rn) anonymous10 if
• all type sets Θi are equal,
• all functions ri coincide and each of them is permutation independent.
Hence, an anonymous Groves mechanism is uniquely determined by a single function r : Θn−1 →
R.
10. Our definition is slightly different than the one introduced in (Moulin, 1986) in that no conditions are put on the
utility functions and the permutation independence refers only to the redistribution function.
9
GUO, MARKAKIS, APT, CONITZER
In general, the VCG mechanism is not anonymous. But it is anonymous when all the type sets
are equal and all the initial utility functions vi coincide. This is the case in the two domains that we
consider in later sections.
For any θ ∈ Θ and any permutation π of {1, . . ., n} we define θpi ∈ Θ by letting
θpii := θpi−1(i).
Denote by Π(k) the set of all permutations of the set {1, . . ., k}. Given a Groves mechanism
r := (r1, . . ., rn) for which the type set Θi is the same for every agent (and equal to some set Θ0),
we construct now a function r′ : Θn−10 → R, following (Moulin, 1986), by setting
r′(x) :=
n∑
j=1
∑
pi∈Π(n−1) rj(x
pi)
n!
,
where xpi is defined analogously to θpi.
Note that r′ is permutation independent, so r′ is an anonymous Groves mechanism. The follow-
ing lemma, which can be of independent interest, shows that some of the properties of r transfer to
r′.
Lemma 3.3 Consider a Groves mechanism r and the corresponding anonymous Groves mecha-
nism r′. Let V CG(θ) :=
∑n
i=1 V CGi(θ), and suppose that the V CG function is permutation
independent. Then:
(i) If r is non-deficit, so is r′.
(ii) If an anonymous Groves mechanism r0 is collectively dominated by r, then it is collectively
dominated by r′.
Proof. For all θ ∈ Θ we have
n∑
i=1
r′i(θ−i) =
∑n
i=1
∑
pi∈Π(n−1)
∑n
j=1 rj((θ−i)
pi)
n!
=
∑n
i=1
∑
pi∈Π(n) ri(θ
pi
−i)
n!
where the last equality holds since in both terms we aggregate over all applications of all ri functions
to all permutations of n− 1 elements of θ.
Let t and t′ be the payment functions of the mechanisms r and r′, respectively. We have
n∑
i=1
t′i(θ) = V CG(θ)−
n∑
i=1
r′i(θ−i)
and for all π ∈ Π(n)
n∑
i=1
ti(θ
pi) = V CG(θpi)−
n∑
i=1
ri(θ
pi
−i).
Hence by the assumption about V CG(θ) it follows that
10
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n∑
i=1
t′i(θ) =
∑
pi∈Π(n)
∑n
i=1 ti(θ
pi)
n!
(2)
(i) is now an immediate consequence of (2).
To prove (ii) let t0 be the payment function of r0. r collectively dominates r0, so for all θ ∈ Θ
and all π ∈ Π(n)
n∑
i=1
ti(θ
pi) ≤
n∑
i=1
t0i (θ
pi)
with at least one inequality strict. Hence for all θ ∈ Θ
∑
pi∈Π(n)
∑n
i=1 ti(θ
pi)
n!
≤
∑
pi∈Π(n)
∑n
i=1 t
0
i (θ
pi)
n!
with at least one inequality strict.
But the fact that r0 is anonymous and the assumption about V CG(θ) imply that for all θ ∈ Θ
and all permutations π of {1, . . ., n}
n∑
i=1
t0i (θ
pi) =
n∑
i=1
t0i (θ),
so by (2) and the above inequality, we have that for all θ ∈ Θ
n∑
i=1
t′i(θ) ≤
n∑
i=1
t0i (θ),
with at least one inequality strict. ✷
The assumption in Lemma 3.3 of permutation independence of V CG(θ) is satisfied in both of
the domains that we consider in Sections 5 and 6. So item (ii) states that if a Groves mechanism
considered in the sequel is not collectively undominated, then it is collectively dominated by an
anonymous Groves mechanism.
We now prove that for a large class of Groves mechanisms that includes the ones we study in
the sequel the introduced relations of dominance differ.
Theorem 3.4 Suppose n ≥ 3. Assume that the sets of types Θi are all equal to the set Θ0 which
contains at least n−1 elements. Then two non-deficit anonymous Groves mechanisms r and r′ exist
such that r collectively dominates r′ but r does not individually dominate r′.
Proof. Fix a non-deficit anonymous Groves mechanism determined by a permutation independent
function r : Θn−10 → R.
Let a1, . . ., an−1 be arbitrary different elements of Θ0. Define a permutation independent func-
tion q : Θn−10 → R by putting
q(x) :=
{
−1 if x is a permutation of (a1, . . ., an−1)
2 otherwise
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Then for each θ ∈ Θn0 at most two of its subsequences θ−i may form a permutation of (a1, . . ., an−1).
But n ≥ 3, so for all θ ∈ Θ,
∑n
i=1 q(θ−i) ≥ 0. This implies that the anonymous Groves mechanism
determined by the function r′ := r − q is non-deficit.
Trivially, the sum of payments under r is less than or equal to the sum of payments under r′,
since r redistributes more money than r′. Moreover for some θ ∈ Θ, for instance θ = (a1, . . ., a1),
we have
∑n
i=1 q(θ−i) > 0. Finally, by definition, q(a1, . . ., an−1) = −1.
These imply that r′ is collectively dominated by r but is not individually dominated by r. ✷
4. Individually undominated mechanisms: characterization and algorithmic
techniques for general domains
In this section, we focus on individually undominated non-deficit Groves mechanisms.
4.1 Non-deficit Groves mechanisms
We start with a characterization of non-deficit Groves mechanisms. Recall first that for a type profile
θ, we denote by V CG(θ) the total VCG payment,
∑n
i=1 V CGi(θ).
Proposition 4.1 A Groves mechanism r is non-deficit if and only if for all i and all θ,
ri(θ−i) ≤ inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rj(θ
′
−j)} (3)
Here, θ′−j are the reported types of the agents other than j when θi is replaced by θ′i.
Proof. We first prove the “if” direction. For any i and θ, Equation 3 implies that ri(θ−i) ≤
V CG(θ′i, θ−i) −
∑
j 6=i
rj(θ
′
−j) for any θ′i ∈ Θi. If we let θ′i = θi, we obtain
∑
j rj(θ−j) ≤
V CG(θi, θ−i) =
∑
i V CGi(θ). Thus, the non-deficit property holds.
We now prove the “only if” direction. To ensure the non-deficit property, for any i, any θ−i,
and any θ′i, we must have ri(θ−i) +
∑
j 6=i
rj(θ
′
−j) ≤ V CG(θ
′
i, θ−i), or equivalently ri(θ−i) ≤
V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rj(θ
′
−j). Since θ′i is arbitrary, Equation 3 follows. ✷
By replacing the “≤” in Equation 3 by “=”, we get a characterization of individually undomi-
nated non-deficit Groves mechanisms.
Theorem 4.2 A Groves mechanism r is non-deficit and individually undominated if and only if for
all i and all θ,
ri(θ−i) = inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rj(θ
′
−j)} (4)
Here, θ′−j are the reported types of the agents other than j when θi is replaced by θ′i.
Proof. We prove the “if” direction first. Any Groves mechanism r that satisfies Equation 4 is non-
deficit by Proposition 4.1. Now suppose that r is individually dominated, that is, there exists another
non-deficit Groves mechanism r′ such that for all i and θ−i, we have r′i(θ−i) ≥ ri(θ−i), and for
12
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some i and θ−i, we have r′i(θ−i) > ri(θ−i). For the i and θ−i that make this inequality strict, we
have
r′i(θ−i) > ri(θ−i) = inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rj(θ
′
−j)}
≥ inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
r′j(θ
′
−j)},
which contradicts with the fact that r′ must satisfy Equation 3. It follows that r is individually
undominated.
Now we prove the “only if” direction. Suppose Equation 4 is not satisfied. Then, there exists
some i and θ−i such that ri(θ−i) < inf
θ′
i
∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rj(θ
′
−j)}. Let a = inf
θ′
i
∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−∑
j 6=i
rj(θ
′
−j)} − ri(θ−i) (so that a > 0), and let r′ be the same as r, except that for the aforemen-
tioned i and θ−i, r′i(θ−i) = ri(θ−i) + a. To show that this does not break the non-deficit constraint,
consider any type vector (θi, θ−i) where i and θ−i are the same as before (that is, any type profile
that is affected). Then,
r′i(θ−i) = a+ ri(θ−i) = inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rj(θ
′
−j)}
= inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
r′j(θ
′
−j)}.
Thus, by Proposition 4.1, r′ is non-deficit. This contradicts that r is individually undominated.
Hence, Equation 4 must hold. ✷
We now give an example of an individually undominated mechanism.
Example 4.3 Consider a single-item auction with n ≥ 3 agents. Agent i bids θi ∈ [0,∞). Let [θ]j
be the jth highest type from the type profile θ. Let us consider the anonymous Groves mechanism
characterized by r(θ−i) = 1n [θ−i]2. That is, under this mechanism, besides paying the VCG pay-
ment, every agent receives 1
n
times the second highest other bid. In fact, this mechanism is the BC
mechanism for single-item auctions. To show that r is individually undominated, it suffices to show
Equation 4 is satisfied. We first observe that for every agent, the second highest other bid is no more
than the second highest bid, which equals the total VCG payment. That is, r is non-deficit. Hence,
Equation 3 holds for all agents and all type profiles. Moreover, for every type profile θ, by setting
θ′i = [θ−i]2, we can verify that Equation 4 holds. It follows that the BC mechanism is individually
undominated for single-item auctions.
In what follows, we first show two examples of single-item auction scenarios, where collective
undominance is strictly stronger than individual undominance for non-deficit Groves mechanisms.
We then propose two techniques for generating individually undominated mechanisms starting from
known individually dominated mechanisms (if the initial mechanism is already individually undom-
inated, then the techniques will return the same mechanism). One technique immediately produces
an individually undominated mechanism. However, it does not preserve anonymity. The second
technique preserves anonymity, and after repeated applications the result converges to an individu-
ally undominated mechanism. We emphasize that we can start with any non-deficit Groves mech-
anism, including the BC mechanism, the Worst-Case Optimal mechanism (Guo & Conitzer, 2009),
the Optimal-in-Expectation Linear mechanisms (Guo & Conitzer, 2010), and the VCG mechanism.
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r(0,0,0) 0 r′(0,0,0) 0
r(1,0,0) 0 r′(1,0,0) 0
r(1,1,0) 1/4 r′(1,1,0) 1/4
r(1,1,1) 1/4 r′(1,1,1) 1/4
r(2,0,0) 0 r′(2,0,0) 0
r(2,1,0) 1/12 r′(2,1,0) 7/24
r(2,1,1) 0 r′(2,1,1) 1/6
r(2,2,0) 1/2 r′(2,2,0) 1/2
r(2,2,1) 0 r′(2,2,1) 1/4
r(2,2,2) 1/2 r′(2,2,2) 1/2
r(3,0,0) 0 r′(3,0,0) 0
r(3,1,0) 1/4 r′(3,1,0) 1/4
r(3,1,1) 0 r′(3,1,1) 1/4
r(3,2,0) 2/3 r′(3,2,0) 2/3
r(3,2,1) 1 r′(3,2,1) 19/24
r(3,2,2) 0 r′(3,2,2) 1/6
r(3,3,0) 2/3 r′(3,3,0) 5/6
r(3,3,1) 0 r′(3,3,1) 7/12
r(3,3,2) 1 r′(3,3,2) 5/6
r(3,3,3) 0 r′(3,3,3) 1/2
Table 1: Computer-generated example mechanisms for differentiating collective undominance and
individual undominance.
4.2 Collective undominance is strictly stronger than individual undominance
We use two examples to show that collective undominance is, in general, strictly stronger than
individual undominance.
Example 4.4 Consider a single-item auction with 4 agents. We assume that for each agent, the set
of allowed types is the same, namely, integers from 0 to 3. Here, the VCG mechanism is just the
second-price auction.
Let us consider the following two anonymous non-deficit Groves mechanisms, which are computer-
generated for differentiating collective undominance and individual undominance.
Mechanism 1: r(θ−i) = r([θ−i]1, [θ−i]2, [θ−i]3), and the function r is given in Table 1. ([θ−i]j
is the jth highest type among types other than i’s own type.)
Mechanism 2: r′(θ−i) = r′([θ−i]1, [θ−i]2, [θ−i]3), and the function r′ is given in Table 1.
With the above characterization, we have that mechanism 2 collectively dominates mechanism
1: for example, for the type profile (3, 2, 2, 2),
∑
i r(θ−i) = 1/2 < 1 =
∑
i r
′(θ−i). On the
other hand, mechanism 2 does not individually dominate mechanism 1: for example, r(3, 3, 2) =
14
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1 > 5/6 = r′(3, 3, 2). In fact, based on the characterization of individually undominated non-
deficit Groves mechanisms (Theorem 4.2), we are able to show that mechanism 1 is individually
undominated.
Example 4.5 Consider a single-item auction with 5 agents. We assume that for each agent, the set
of allowed types is [0,∞). Here, the VCG mechanism is just the second-price auction.
Let us consider the following two anonymous non-deficit Groves mechanisms:
Mechanism 1:
r(θ−i) = 0 if all four types in θ−i are identical.
r(θ−i) = [θ−i]1/4 if the highest three types in θ−i are identical, and they are strictly higher than
the lowest type in θ−i.
r(θ−i) = [θ−i]1/6 if the highest two types in θ−i are identical, and they are strictly higher than
the third highest type in θ−i.
r(θ−i) = 3[θ−i]2/16 if the highest type in θ−i is strictly higher than the second highest type in
θ−i, and the second highest type in θ−i is identical to the third highest type in θ−i.
r(θ−i) = [θ−i]2/5 if the highest three types in θ−i are all different.
Mechanism 2 (BC):
r′(θ−i) = [θ−i]2/5.
With the above characterization, we have that mechanism 2 collectively dominates mechanism
1: for example, for the type profile (3, 2, 2, 2, 2),
∑
i r(θ−i) = 4r(3, 2, 2, 2) + r(2, 2, 2, 2) =
3/2+0 = 3/2 <
∑
i r
′(θ−i) = 4r
′(3, 2, 2, 2) + r′(2, 2, 2, 2) = 8/5+ 2/5 = 2. On the other hand,
mechanism 2 does not individually dominate mechanism 1: for example, r(4, 4, 4, 1) = 1 > 4/5 =
r′(4, 4, 4, 1). In fact, based on the characterization of individually undominated non-deficit Groves
mechanisms (Theorem 4.2), we are able to show that mechanism 1 is individually undominated.
4.3 A priority-based technique
Given a non-deficit Groves mechanism r and a priority order over agents π, we can improve r into
an individually undominated mechanism as follows:
1) Let π : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} be a permutation representing the priority order. That is,
π(i) is agent i’s priority value (the lower the value, the higher the priority). π−1(k) is then the agent
with the kth highest priority. The high-level idea of the priority-based technique is that we go over
the agents one by one. For the first agent (the agent with the highest priority), we maximize his
redistribution function subject to the constraint of Proposition 4.1. For later agents, we do the same,
but take into consideration that earlier agents’ redistribution functions have been updated. A priority
order can be arbitrary. Generally, agents with high priorities benefit more from this technique, since
for earlier agents, there is more room for improvement.
2) Let i = π−1(1), and update ri to
rpii (θ−i) = inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
pi(j)>1
rj(θ
′
−j)}.
That is, the update ensures that at this point rpi satisfies Equation 4 for i = π−1(1).
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It should be noted that during the above update, only the payment of agent i = π−1(1) is
changed, and it is changed by
rpii (θ−i)− ri(θ−i) = inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
pi(j)>1
rj(θ
′
−j)} − ri(θ−i)
= inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j
rj(θ
′
−j)} = S
BCGC
i (θ−i).
That is, essentially, the above update amounts to applying the BCGC(i) transformation on r, where
i = π−1(1).
3) We will now consider the remaining agents in turn, according to the order π. In the kth step,
we update ri (i = π−1(k)) to
rpii (θ−i) = inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
pi(j)>k
rj(θ
′
−j)−
∑
pi(j)<k
rpij (θ
′
−j)}.
That is, the update ensures that at this point rpi satisfies Equation 4 when i = π−1(k). To avoid
breaking the non-deficit property, when we make the update, we take the previous k − 1 updates
into account. For this update, what we are doing is essentially applying the BCGC(π−1(k)) trans-
formation on the resulting mechanism from the previous update.
Overall, for every agent i,
rpii (θ−i) = inf
θ′
i
∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
pi(j)>pi(i)
rj(θ
′
−j)−
∑
pi(j)<pi(i)
rpij (θ
′
−j)}.
The new mechanism rpi satisfies the following properties:
Proposition 4.6 For all i and θ−i, rpii (θ−i) ≥ ri(θ−i).
Proof. First consider i = π−1(1), the agent with the highest priority. For any θ−i, we have
rpii (θ−i) = inf
θ′
i
∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i) −
∑
j 6=i
rj(θ
′
−j)}. Since r is non-deficit, by Equation 3, we have
ri(θ−i) ≤ inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rj(θ
′
−j)}. Hence rpii (θ−i) ≥ ri(θ−i).
For any i 6= π−1(1), rpii (θ−i) equals
ri(θ−i) + inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)− ri(θ−i)−
∑
pi(j)>pi(i)
rj(θ
′
−j)−
∑
pi(j)<pi(i)
rpij (θ
′
−j)}.
We must show that
inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)− ri(θ−i)−
∑
pi(j)>pi(i)
rj(θ
′
−j)−
∑
pi(j)<pi(i)
rpij (θ
′
−j)} ≥ 0. (5)
Consider p = π−1(π(i) − 1) (the agent immediately before i in terms of priority). For any
θi, θ−i, we have
V CG(θi, θ−i)− ri(θ−i)−
∑
pi(j)>pi(i)
rj(θ−j)−
∑
pi(j)<pi(i)
rpij (θ−j)
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= V CG(θi, θ−i)−
∑
pi(j)>pi(p)
rj(θ−j)−
∑
pi(j)<pi(p)
rpij (θ−j)− r
pi
p (θ−p)
≥ inf
θ′p∈Θp
{V CG(θ′p, θ−p)−
∑
pi(j)>pi(p)
rj(θ
′
−j)−
∑
pi(j)<pi(p)
rpij (θ
′
−j)} − r
pi
p (θ−p) = 0.
In the above inequality, θ′−j is the set of types reported by the agents other than j, when θp is
replaced by θ′p. Because θi is arbitrary, Equation 5 follows. Therefore, rpii (θ−i) ≥ ri(θ−i) for all i
and θ−i. ✷
Proposition 4.7 rpi is individually undominated.
Proof. Let i = π−1(n). For all θ,
V CG(θ)−
∑
j=1,...,n
rpij (θ−j) ≥ inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rpij (θ
′
−j)} − r
pi
i (θ−i) = 0.
Hence rpi never incurs a deficit. So, rpi is non-deficit.
Using Proposition 4.6, we have for all i and all θ,
rpii (θ−i) = inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
pi(j)>pi(i)
rj(θ
′
−j)−
∑
pi(j)<pi(i)
rpij (θ
′
−j)}
≥ inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rpij (θ
′
−j)}.
Because rpi is non-deficit, the opposite inequality must also be satisfied (Equation 3)—hence we
must have equality, that is, Equation 4 must hold. It follows that rpi is individually undominated. ✷
It should be noted that for the above technique, during the updates, we need to keep track of
the value of rpii (θ−i) for all i and θ−i. That is, due to space complexity, the above technique is
more suitable for cases with few agents and few possible types. To reduce space complexity, when
we update, we could also recompute earlier updates in a recursive fashion. By doing so, the later
updates are much more difficult to compute compared to the earlier updates. Fortunately, the earlier
updates tend to be more important, because there is generally more room for improvement during
the earlier updates. Therefore, a reasonable approximation would be to update only for a few high-
priority agents and ignore the remaining agents with low priorities.
4.4 An iterative technique that preserves anonymity
The previous technique will, in general, not produce an anonymous mechanism, even if the input
mechanism is anonymous. This is because agents higher in the priority order tend to benefit more
from the technique. Here, we will introduce another technique that preserves anonymity.
Given an anonymous mechanism r, let r0 = r. For all i and all θ, let
rk+1(θ−i) =
n− 1
n
rk(θ−i) +
1
n
inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rk(θ′−j)}.
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It is easily seen by induction that all the rk mechanisms are anonymous. If rk is anony-
mous, then for any π ∈ Π(n − 1), rk((θ−i)pi) = rk(θ−i) for all θ and all i. We also have that
V CG(θ′i, (θ−i)
pi) = V CG(θ′i, θ−i) for all θ, all θ′i, and all i. Finally, let ((θ−i)pi, θ′i) be the type
profile where the types in θ−i are permuted according to π, and θi is replaced by θ′i. We have∑
j 6=i r
k(((θ−i)
pi, θ′i)−j) =
∑
j 6=i r
k(θ′−j) for all θ, all i, and all θ′i. The above implies that rk+1 is
also permutation independent, thus anonymous.
It should be noted that from rk to rk+1, agent i’s payment is changed by
rk+1(θ−i)− r
k(θ−i)
= n−1
n
rk(θ−i) +
1
n
inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rk(θ′−j)} − r
k(θ−i)
= 1
n
inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j
rk(θ′−j)}
= 1
n
SBCGCi (θ−i).
That is, essentially, rk+1 is the resulting mechanism by applying the BCGC transform on rk.
The next propositions immediately follow from Proposition 2.3:
Proposition 4.8 If r0 is non-deficit, then rk is non-deficit for all k.
Proposition 4.9 For all i and θ−i, rk(θ−i) is nondecreasing in k.
Proposition 4.10 If rk+1 = rk, then rk is individually undominated.
Proposition 4.11 If rk is not individually undominated, then rk+1 individually dominates rk.
Finally, the following proposition establishes convergence.
Proposition 4.12 As k →∞, rk converges (pointwise) to an individually undominated mechanism.
Proof. By Proposition 4.9, the rk(θ−i) are nondecreasing in k, and since every rk is non-deficit by
Proposition 4.8, they must be bounded; hence they must converge (pointwise). For any i and θ−i,
let
dk = inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rk(θ′−j)} − r
k(θ−i).
Using Proposition 4.9, we derive the following inequality:
dk+1 = inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rk+1(θ′−j)} − r
k+1(θ−i)
≤ inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rk(θ′−j)} − r
k+1(θ−i)
= inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rk(θ′−j)}
= −
n− 1
n
rk(θ−i)−
1
n
inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rk(θ′−j)}
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=
n− 1
n
inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rk(θ′−j)} −
n− 1
n
rk(θ−i) =
n− 1
n
dk.
As k →∞, dk = inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rk(θ′−j)} − r
k(θ−i) → 0. So in the limit, Equation 4
is satisfied. Thus, rk converges (pointwise, linearly) to an individually undominated mechanism. ✷
Similar to the priority-based technique, in the above iterative process, when computing for rk,
we need the value of rk−1(θ−i), for all θ−i. That is, due to space complexity, the above technique
is more suitable for cases with few agents and few possible types. To reduce the space complexity
we could also recompute rk−1 in a recursive fashion. By doing so, rk becomes much more difficult
to compute for large values of k. Fortunately, the earlier iterative steps are more crucial, because
there is generally more room for improvement during the earlier steps. Therefore a reasonable
approximation would be to only compute a few iterative steps.
5. Multi-unit auctions with unit demand
In this section, we consider auctions where there are multiple identical units of a single good and all
agents have unit demand, i.e., each agent wants only one unit (if there is a single unit of the good, we
simply have the standard single-item auction). We focus on the notion of collectively undominated
mechanisms and how it relates to that of individually undominated mechanisms. In particular, we
first obtain an analytical characterization of all collectively undominated Groves mechanisms that
are non-deficit, anonymous, and have linear payment functions, by proving that the Optimal-in-
Expectation Linear redistribution mechanisms (OEL) (Guo & Conitzer, 2010), which include the
BC mechanism, are the only collectively undominated Groves mechanisms that are anonymous and
linear. We then show that individual undominance and collective undominance are equivalent if
we restrict our consideration to Groves mechanisms that are anonymous and linear in the setting of
multi-unit auctions with unit demand. Note that even for single-item auctions, the examples given
in Section 4.2 show that this equivalence does not hold if we do not restrict ourselves to linear and
anonymous mechanisms.
If one mechanism collectively dominates another mechanism, then under the first mechanism,
the agents’ expected total utility, if there was a prior distribution over the agents’ valuations, must
be no less than that under the second mechanism, and strictly higher under minimal conditions on
the prior distribution. Therefore, a good direction in which to look for collectively undominated
mechanisms is to start with those mechanisms that are optimal-in-expectation.
The Optimal-in-Expectation Linear (OEL) redistribution mechanisms (Guo & Conitzer, 2010),
described below, are special cases of non-deficit Groves mechanisms that are anonymous and lin-
ear. The OEL mechanisms are defined only for multi-unit auctions with unit demand. In a unit
demand multi-unit auction, there are m indistinguishable units for sale, and each agent is interested
in only one unit. For agent i, his type θi is his valuation for winning one unit. We assume all bids
(announced types) are bounded below by L and above by U , i.e., Θi = [L,U ] (note that L can be
0).
A linear and anonymous Groves mechanism is characterized by a function r of the following
form: r(θ−i) = c0+
n−1∑
j=1
cj [θ−i]j (where [θ−i]j is the jth highest bid among θ−i). For OEL mecha-
nisms, the cj’s are chosen according to one of the following options (indexed by integer parameter
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k, where k ranges from 0 to n, and k −m is odd):
k = 0:
ci = (−1)
m−i
(
n− i− 1
n−m− 1
)
/
(
m− 1
i− 1
)
for i = 1, . . . ,m,
c0 = Um/n− U
m∑
i=1
(−1)m−i
(
n− i− 1
n−m− 1
)
/
(
m− 1
i− 1
)
,
ci = 0 for other values of i.
k = 1,2, . . . ,m:
ci = (−1)
m−i
(
n− i− 1
n−m− 1
)
/
(
m− 1
i− 1
)
for i = k + 1, . . . ,m,
ck = m/n−
m∑
i=k+1
(−1)m−i
(
n− i− 1
n−m− 1
)
/
(
m− 1
i− 1
)
,
ci = 0 for other values of i.
k = m+ 1,m+ 2, . . . ,n− 1:
ci = (−1)
m−i−1
(
i− 1
m− 1
)
/
(
n−m− 1
n− i− 1
)
for i = m+ 1, . . . , k − 1,
ck = m/n−
k−1∑
i=m+1
(−1)m−i−1
(
i− 1
m− 1
)
/
(
n−m− 1
n− i− 1
)
,
ci = 0 for other values of i.
k = n:
ci = (−1)
m−i−1
(
i− 1
m− 1
)
/
(
n−m− 1
n− i− 1
)
for i = m+ 1, . . . , n− 1,
c0 = Lm/n− L
n−1∑
i=m+1
(−1)m−i−1
(
i− 1
m− 1
)
/
(
n−m− 1
n− i− 1
)
,
ci = 0 for other values of i.
For example, when k = m + 1, we have cm+1 = m/n and ci = 0 for all other i. For
this specific OEL mechanism, r(θ−i) = mn [θ−i]m+1. That is, besides participating in the VCG
mechanism, every agent also receives an amount that is equal to m/n times the (m + 1)th highest
bid from the other agents. Actually, this is exactly the BC mechanism for multi-unit auctions with
unit demand.
Besides being non-deficit, one property of the OEL mechanisms is that they are always budget
balanced in the following scenarios.
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• [θ]1 = U and k = 0
• [θ]k+1 = [θ]k and k ∈ {1, . . ., n− 1}
• [θ]n = L and k = n
Using this property, we will prove that the OEL mechanisms are the only collectively undomi-
nated non-deficit Groves mechanisms that are anonymous and linear.
We first show that the OEL mechanisms are collectively undominated.
Theorem 5.1 For multi-unit auctions with unit demand, there is no non-deficit Groves mechanism
that collectively dominates an OEL mechanism.
By using Lemma 3.3, we only need to prove this for the case of anonymous Groves mechanisms.
Lemma 5.2 For multi-unit auctions with unit demand, there is no non-deficit anonymous Groves
mechanism that collectively dominates an OEL mechanism.
Proof. We first prove: no OEL mechanism with index k ∈ {1, . . ., n − 1} is collectively dominated
by a non-deficit anonymous Groves mechanism.
Suppose a non-deficit anonymous Groves mechanism r collectively dominates an OEL mecha-
nism with index k ∈ {1, . . ., n − 1}. We use rOEL to denote this OEL mechanism. For any i and
θ−i, we define the following function:
∆(θ−i) = r(θ−i)− r
OEL(θ−i).
Since r collectively dominates rOEL, we have that for any θ,
∑n
i=1∆(θ−i) ≥ 0.
We also have that, whenever [θ]k+1 = [θ]k, the OEL mechanism is budget balanced. That
is, under rOEL, the agents’ total payment is 0; in this case, since r is non-deficit, we must have∑n
i=1∆(θ−i) = 0.
Now we claim that ∆(θ−i) = 0 for all θ−i. Let C(θ−i) be the number of bids among θ−i that
equal [θ−i]k. Hence, we must show that for all θ−i with C(θ−i) ≥ 1, we have ∆(θ−i) = 0.
We now prove it by induction on the value of C(θ−i) (backwards, from n− 1 to 1).
Base case: C(θ−i) = n− 1.
Suppose there is a θ−i with C(θ−i) = n − 1. That is, all the bids in θ−i are identical. When θi
is also equal to the bids in θ−i, all bids in θ are the same so that [θ]k+1 = [θ]k. Hence, by our earlier
observation, we have
∑n
j=1∆(θ−j) = 0. But we know that for all j, θ−j is the same set of bids.
Hence ∆(θ−i) = 0 for all θ−i when C(θ−i) = n− 1.
Induction step.
Let us assume that for all θ−i, if C(θ−i) ≥ p (where p ∈ {2, . . ., n − 1}), then ∆(θ−i) = 0.
Now we consider any θ−i with C(θ−i) = p− 1. When θi is equal to [θ−i]k, we have [θ]k = [θ]k+1,
which implies that
∑n
j=1∆(θ−j) = 0. For all j with θj = [θ−i]k, ∆(θ−j) = ∆(θ−i), and for other
j, C(θ−j) = p. Therefore, by the induction assumption,
∑n
j=1∆(θ−j) is a positive multiple of
∆(θ−i), which implies that ∆(θ−i) = 0.
By induction, we have shown that ∆(θ−i) = 0 for all θ−i. This implies that r and rOEL are
identical. Hence, no other non-deficit anonymous Groves mechanism collectively dominates an
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OEL mechanism with index k ∈ {1, . . ., n− 1}.
Now we prove: the OEL mechanism with index k = 0 is not collectively dominated by a different
non-deficit anonymous Groves mechanism.
Suppose a non-deficit anonymous Groves mechanism r collectively dominates an OEL mecha-
nism with index k = 0. We use rOEL to denote this OEL mechanism. For any i and θ−i, we define
the following function:
∆(θ−i) = r(θ−i)− r
OEL(θ−i).
Since r collectively dominates rOEL, we have that for any θ,
∑n
i=1∆(θ−i) ≥ 0. We also have
that, whenever [θ]1 = U , under rOEL, the agents’ total payment is 0; in this case, because r is
non-deficit, we must have
∑n
i=1∆(θ−i) = 0.
Now we claim that ∆(θ−i) = 0 for all θ−i. Let C(θ−i) be the number of bids among θ−i that
equal U . Hence, we must show that for all θ−i with C(θ−i) ≥ 0, we have ∆(θ−i) = 0.
We now prove it by induction on the value of C(θ−i) (backwards, from n− 1 to 0).
Base case: C(θ−i = n− 1.
Suppose there is a θ−i with C(θ−i) = n−1. That is, all the bids in θ−i are equal to U . When θi
is also equal to the bids in U , by our earlier observation, we have
∑n
j=1∆(θ−j) = 0. But we know
that for all j, ∆(θ−j) is the same value. Hence ∆(θ−i) = 0 for all θ−i when C(θ−i) = n− 1.
Induction step.
Let us assume that for all θ−i, if C(θ−i) ≥ p (where p ∈ {2, . . ., n − 1}), then ∆(θ−i) = 0.
Now we consider any θ−i with C(θ−i) = p − 1. When θi is equal to U , we have [θ]1 = U ,
which implies that
∑n
j=1∆(θ−j) = 0. For all j with θj = U , ∆(θ−j) = ∆(θ−i), and for other
j, C(θ−j) = p. Therefore, by the induction assumption,
∑n
j=1∆(θ−j) is a positive multiple of
∆(θ−i), which implies that ∆(θ−i) = 0.
By induction, we have shown that ∆(θ−i) = 0 for all θ−i. This implies that r and rOEL are
identical. Hence, no other non-deficit anonymous Groves mechanism collectively dominates the
OEL mechanism with index k = 0.
It remains to prove: the OEL mechanism with index k = n is not collectively dominated by
a different non-deficit anonymous Groves mechanism.
This case is similar to the case of k = 0 and we omit it here. ✷
We now proceed to show that within the family of anonymous and linear non-deficit Groves
mechanisms, the OEL mechanisms are the only ones that are collectively undominated. Actually,
they are also the only ones that are individually undominated, which is a stronger claim since being
individually undominated is a weaker property.
Theorem 5.3 For multi-unit auctions with unit demand, if an anonymous linear non-deficit Groves
mechanism is individually undominated, then it must be an OEL mechanism.
Before proving this theorem, let us introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 5.4 Let I be the set of points (s1, s2, . . . , sk) (U ≥ s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sk ≥ L) that satisfy
Q0+Q1s1+Q2s2+. . .+Qksk = 0 (the Qi are constants). If the measure of I is positive (Lebesgue
measure on Rk), then Qi = 0 for all i.
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Proof. If Qi 6= 0 for some i, then for any U ≥ s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ si−1 ≥ si+1 ≥ . . . ≥ sk ≥ L, to
make Q0 +Q1s1 +Q2s2 + . . .+Qksk = 0, si can take at most one value. As a result the measure
of I must be 0. ✷
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 5.3.
Proof. Let r be a non-deficit anonymous linear Groves mechanism. We recall that a Groves mecha-
nism is anonymous and linear if r is a linear function defined as r(θ−i) = a0+
n−1∑
j=1
aj[θ−i]j (where
[θ−i]j is the jth highest type among θ−i, and the aj’s are constants).
Under multi-unit auctions with unit demand, the total VCG payment equals m[θ]m+1 (m times
the (m+ 1)th bid). Under r, the agents’ total payment equals
m[θ]m+1 −
n∑
i=1
r(θ−i) = m[θ]m+1 − na0 −
n∑
i=1
n−1∑
j=1
aj[θ−i]j .
The above total payment is a linear function in terms of the types among θ. For simplicity, we
rewrite the total payment as C0+C1[θ]1+C2[θ]2+ . . .+Cn[θ]n. The Ci are constants determined
by the ai. We have
C0 = −na0
C1 = −(n− 1)a1
C2 = −a1 − (n− 2)a2
C3 = −2a2 − (n− 3)a3
.
.
.
Cm = −(m− 1)am−1 − (n−m)am
Cm+1 = −mam − (n−m− 1)am+1 +m
Cm+2 = −(m+ 1)am+1 − (n−m− 2)am+2
.
.
.
Cn−1 = −(n− 2)an−2 − an−1
Cn = −(n− 1)an−1
Given any θ−i, for any possible value of θi, we must have
n∑
i=1
ti(θ) ≥ 0 (non-deficit). That is,
for any θ−i, we have inf
θi
n∑
i=1
ti(θ) ≥ 0. If for some θ−i, we have inf
θi
n∑
i=1
ti(θ) > ǫ (ǫ > 0), then we
can reduce the payment of agent i by ǫ without violating the non-deficit constraint, when the other
agents’ types are θ−i. Therefore, if the mechanism is individually undominated, then for any θ−i,
we have inf
θi
n∑
i=1
ti(θ) = 0.
We denote [θ−i]j by sj (j = 1, . . . , n− 1). That is, s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sn−1.
The expression inf
θi
n∑
i=1
ti(θ) then equals the minimum of the following expressions:
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inf
L≤θi≤sn−1
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)
inf
sn−1≤θi≤sn−2
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)
.
.
.
inf
s2≤θi≤s1
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)
inf
s1≤θi≤U
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)
We take a closer look at inf
L≤θi≤sn−1
n∑
i=1
ti(θ). When L ≤ θi ≤ sn−1, the jth highest type
[θ]j = sj for j = 1, . . . , n − 1, and the nth highest type [θ]n = θi (this case corresponds to agent i
being the agent with the lowest type). We have
inf
L≤θi≤sn−1
n∑
i=1
ti(θ) = inf
L≤θi≤sn−1
(C0 + C1s1 + C2s2 + . . . +Cn−1sn−1 +Cnθi)
= min{C0 +C1s1 + . . .+ Cn−1sn−1 + CnL,C0 + C1s1 + . . . + Cn−1sn−1 + Cnsn−1}.
That is, because the expression is linear, the minimum is reached when θi is set to either the lower
bound L or the upper bound sn−1.
Similarly, we have
inf
sn−1≤θi≤sn−2
n∑
i=1
ti(θ) = min{C0 + C1s1 + . . .+ Cn−2sn−2 + Cn−1sn−1 + Cnsn−1,
C0 +C1s1 + C2s2 + . . .+ Cn−2sn−2 + Cn−1sn−2 + Cnsn−1},
.
.
.
inf
s2≤θi≤s1
n∑
i=1
ti(θ) = min{C0 +C1s1 + C2s1 + C3s2 + . . .+ Cnsn−1,
C0 + C1s1 + C2s2 + C3s2 + . . . +Cnsn−1},
inf
s1≤θi≤U
n∑
i=1
ti(θ) = min{C0 + C1U + C2s1 + . . .+ Cnsn−1,
C0 + C1s1 + C2s1 + . . .+ Cnsn−1}.
Putting all the above together, we have that for any U ≥ s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sn−1 ≥ L, the
minimum of the following expressions is 0.
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• (n): C0 + C1s1 + C2s2 + . . .+ Cn−1sn−1 + CnL
• (n− 1): C0 + C1s1 + C2s2 + . . .+ Cn−1sn−1 + Cnsn−1
• (n− 2): C0 + C1s1 + C2s2 + . . .+ Cn−2sn−2 + Cn−1sn−2 + Cnsn−1
•
.
.
.
• (2): C0 +C1s1 + C2s2 + C3s2 + . . .+ Cnsn−1
• (1): C0 +C1s1 + C2s1 + C3s2 + . . .+ Cnsn−1
• (0): C0 +C1U + C2s1 +C3s2 + . . .+ Cnsn−1
The above expressions are numbered from 0 to n. Let I(i) be the set of points (s1, s2, . . . , sn−1)
(U ≥ s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sn−1 ≥ L) that make expression (i) equal to 0. There must exist at least
one i such that the measure of I(i) is positive. According to Lemma 5.4, expression (i) must be the
constant 0.
If expression (0) is constant 0, then the total payment under r is 0 whenever the highest type is
equal to the upper bound U . That is, for any θ, the total payment C0+C1[θ]1+C2[θ]2+. . .+Cn[θ]n
must be a constant multiple of U−[θ]1 (the total payment is a linear function). We haveC0 = −UC1
and Cj = 0 for j ≥ 2. It turns out that the above equalities of the Cj completely determine
the values of the aj (the values of the aj can be solved for based on the Cj by pure algebraic
manipulations), and the corresponding mechanism is the OEL mechanism with index k = 0. If
expression (i) is constant for other values of i, then the corresponding mechanism is the OEL
mechanism with another index. ✷
Hence, we have the following complete characterization in this context.
Corollary 5.5 For multi-unit auctions with unit demand, a non-deficit anonymous linear Groves
mechanism is individually / collectively undominated if and only if it is an OEL mechanism.
Proof. This corollary can be proved by combining Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.3, as well as the
fact that a collectively undominated mechanism is also individually undominated. ✷
The above corollary also shows that if we consider only Groves mechanisms that are non-deficit,
anonymous, and linear in the setting of multi-unit auctions with unit demand, then individual un-
dominance and collective undominance are equivalent. Thus, we have characterized all individu-
ally/collectively undominated Groves mechanisms that are non-deficit, anonymous, and linear for
multi-unit auctions with unit demand.
6. The public project problem
We now study a well known class of decision problems, namely public project problems (see, e.g.,
Mas-Colell et al., 1995; Moulin, 1988; Moore, 2006). In this setting a set of n agents needs to
decide on financing a project of cost c. An agent’s type is her private valuation for the project if it
takes place. We consider two versions of the problem.
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6.1 Equal participation costs
In this case if the project takes place, each agent contributes the same share, c/n, so as to cover the
total cost. Hence the participation costs of all agents are the same. So the problem is defined as
follows.
Public project problem
Consider (D,Θ1, . . .,Θn, v1, . . ., vn), where
• D = {0, 1} (reflecting whether a project is canceled or takes place),
• for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, Θi = [0, c], where c > 0,
• for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, vi(d, θi) := d(θi − cn),
When the agents employ a payment-based mechanism to decide on the project, then in addition
to c/n, each agent also has to pay or receive the payment, ti(θ), imposed by the mechanism. By
the result of Holmstrom (Holmstro¨m, 1979), the only efficient and strategy-proof payment-based
mechanisms in this domain are Groves mechanisms. To determine the efficient outcome for a given
type vector θ, note that
∑n
i=1 vi(d, θi) = d(
∑n
i=1 θi − c). Hence efficiency here for a mechanism
(f, t) means that f(θ) = 1 if
∑n
i=1 θi ≥ c and f(θ) = 0 otherwise, i.e., the project takes place if
and only if the declared total value that the agents have for the project exceeds its cost.
We first observe the following result.
Proposition 6.1 In the public project problem with equal participation costs, the BC mechanism
coincides with VCG.
Proof. It suffices to check that in equation (1) it holds that SBCGCi (θ−i) = 0 for all i and all θ−i.
Since VCG is a non-deficit mechanism, we have SBCGCi (θ−i) ≥ 0, as the term SBCGCi (θ−i) is a
sum of payments for some type vector. Hence all we need is to show that there is a value for θ′i that
makes the expression in (1) equal to 0. Checking this is quite simple. If∑j 6=i θj < n−1n c, then we
take θ′i := 0 and otherwise θ′i := c. In the former case the efficient outcome is to not implement the
project whereas in the latter case, the opposite occurs. It is easy to check that in both cases we have
SBCGCi (θ−i) = 0. ✷
We now show that in fact VCG cannot be improved upon. Before stating our result, we would
like to note that one ideally would like to have a mechanism that is budget-balanced, i.e.,
∑
i ti(θ) =
0 for all θ, so that in total the agents only pay the cost of the project and no more. However this
is not possible and as explained in (page 861-862 Mas-Colell et al., 1995), for the public project
problem no mechanism exists that is efficient, strategy-proof and budget balanced. Our theorem
below considerably strengthens this result, showing that VCG is optimal with respect to minimizing
the total payment of the agents.
Theorem 6.2 In the public project problem there exists no non-deficit Groves mechanism that col-
lectively dominates the VCG mechanism.
As with the case of unit-demand auctions, we first establish the desired conclusion for anony-
mous Groves mechanisms and then extend it to arbitrary ones by Lemma 3.3. Notice that VCG is
anonymous in this setting and hence we can apply Lemma 3.3(ii).
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Lemma 6.3 In the public project problem there exists no anonymous non-deficit Groves mechanism
that collectively dominates the VCG mechanism.
Proof. Suppose that an anonymous non-deficit Groves mechanism (r1, ..., rn) exists that collec-
tively dominates VCG. By anonymity, for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n} ri = r, for some function r :
[0, c]n−1 → R. Hence
∀ θ ∈ [0, c]n
n∑
i=1
r(θ−i) ≥ 0 (6)
We will show that then for all x ∈ [0, c]n−1, r(x) = 0 and thus r coincides with VCG.
We divide our proof into two cases.
Case 1: The vector x satisfies
n−1∑
i=1
xi ≥
n− 1
n
c.
Given such an x, define C(x) = |{i : xi = c}|, i.e., given a vector x of n− 1 types, C(x) is the
number of agents who submitted c. Define the following predicate:
P (k) : ∀x ∈ [0, c]n−1 ((C(x) = k ∧
n−1∑
i=1
xi ≥
n− 1
n
c)→ r(x) = 0)
We now prove that P (k) holds for all k ∈ {0, . . ., n − 1}, using induction (going backwards
from n− 1). Let ti(θ) = V CGi(θ)− r(θ−i) be the payment function of agent i under the mecha-
nism r.
Base case.
Let x be such that C(x) = n−1. Consider θ := (c, . . ., c) ∈ [0, c]n. Then for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n},
θ−i = x. Clearly f(θ) = 1 and no agent is paying anything under the VCG mechanism in this
instance, i.e., V CGi(θ) = 0.
Since r is a non-deficit mechanism
0 ≤
n∑
i=1
ti(θ) =
n∑
i=1
V CGi(θ)−
n∑
i=1
r(θ−i) = −
n∑
i=1
r(θ−i) = −nr(x),
But then by (6) we have r(x) = 0.
Induction step.
Assume P (k) holds for some k ≥ 1. We will prove P (k− 1). Let x be such that C(x) = k− 1
(note that x may have zero c’s). Since r is permutation independent, we can assume without loss
of generality that the elements of x are sorted in descending order (i.e., r(x) does not change by
such a reordering). Consider the type vector θ = (c, x), that is the concatenation of (c) and x.
Hence θ starts with k c’s and the rest is like the rest of x. Note that for i ∈ {1, . . ., k}, θ−i = x
and C(θ−i) = k − 1. For i ∈ {k + 1, . . ., n}, C(θ−i) = k, therefore by induction hypothesis,
r(θ−i) = 0. This means that
∑n
i=1 r(θ−i) = kr(x).
Furthermore, f(θ) = 1 since θ has at least one c, and no agent is paying payment under the VCG
mechanism. To see this, if k ≥ 2, then for every agent under θ, there is another agent who submitted
c hence the agent is not pivotal. If k = 1, then no agent can alter the decision outcome by the fact
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that
∑
xi ≥
n−1
n
· c, hence no agent is pivotal in this case as well. Thus, for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n},
V CGi(θ) = 0, and because r is non-deficit
0 ≤
n∑
i=1
ti(θ) = −
n∑
i=1
r(θ−i) = −kr(x)
But then by (6) we have that r(x) = 0. This concludes the induction step and consequently r(x) = 0
for all vectors x that belong to Case 1.
Case 2: The vector x satisfies
n−1∑
i=0
xi <
n− 1
n
c. The proof for this case uses a completely symmet-
ric argument to that of Case 1. We include it below for the sake of completeness.
Define C ′(x) = |{i : xi = 0}|. In analogy to the predicate P (k) of Case 1, we define the
following predicate:
P ′(k) : ∀x ∈ [0, c]n−1((C ′(x) = k ∧
n−1∑
i=0
xi <
n− 1
n
c)→ r(x) = 0)
We now prove that P ′(k) holds for all k ∈ {0, ..., n − 1}, using induction (going backwards
from n− 1).
Base case.
Let x be such that C ′(x) = n− 1, i.e., the zero vector. Consider θ := (0, ..., 0) ∈ [0, c]n. Then
for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, θ−i = x. Clearly f(θ) = 0 and no agent is paying anything under the VCG
mechanism. Hence if ti(θ) is the payment paid by agent i, then
∑
ti(θ) = −
∑
r(θ−i) = −nr(x).
Since r is a non-deficit mechanism,
0 ≤
n∑
i=1
ti(θ) = −nr(x)
Then by (6) this implies that r(x) = 0.
Induction step.
Suppose P ′(k) holds for some k ≥ 1. We will prove P ′(k−1). Let x be such thatC ′(x) = k−1.
Since r is permutation independent, we can assume without loss of generality that the elements of
x are sorted in increasing order so that all 0’s are on the left side of x (note that it may also be
that x does not have any 0’s, since k − 1 maybe equal to 0). Consider the type vector θ = (0, x).
So θ starts with k 0’s and the rest is like the rest of x. Note that for i ∈ {1, . . ., k}, θ−i = x and
C ′(θ−i) = k − 1. For i ∈ {k + 1, . . ., n}, C ′(θ−i) = k and by induction hypothesis, r(θ−i) = 0
and hence
∑
r(θ−i) = kr(x).
We note that f(θ) = 0 and that also no agent is paying payment under the VCG mechanism. To
see this, it is enough to verify that no agent is pivotal, which follows by the fact that we are in the
case that
∑n−1
i=0 xi <
n−1
n
c. Since θ = (0, x), no agent can be pivotal. Therefore V CGi(θ) = 0 for
every i ∈ {1, . . ., n}. Since r is non-deficit we have 0 ≤ −
∑
r(θ−i) = −kr(x). By (6) we have
r(x) = 0.
This completes the proof of the induction step and hence Case 2. Since Cases 1 and 2 cover all
vectors x ∈ [0, c]n−1, the proof of the Lemma is complete. ✷
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By using now Lemma 6.3 and Lemma 3.3(ii), the proof of Theorem 6.2 is complete.
An interesting open question is whether other mechanisms that share some of the properties of
the VCG mechanism are also collectively undominated. In particular, we have exhibited that VCG
is a pay-only and anonymous mechanism. Are there other anonymous or pay-only mechanisms that
are collectively undominated for the public project problem with equal participation costs?
We start with pay-only mechanisms. We provide a general observation that holds in many
domains other than public project problems, showing that the VCG mechanism dominates all other
pay-only mechanisms.
Lemma 6.4 Let r be a Groves mechanism. Suppose that the following condition 11 holds for all
i ∈ {1, . . ., n}:
∀θ−i ∈ Θ−i ∃b
∗
i ∈ Θi such that V CGi(b∗i , θ−i)− ri(θ−i) = 0.
Then r individually dominates all other pay-only Groves mechanisms.
The condition essentially says that every agent is always able to make his payment equal to 0 for
any type vector θ−i of the other agents.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a pay-only mechanism r′ = (r′1, . . ., r′n) different from r =
(r1, . . ., rn) and not dominated by r. Then, for some θ ∈ Θ and i ∈ {1, . . .n}, r′i(θ−i) > ri(θ−i).
Let b∗i be the type of agent i that satisfies the condition of the theorem. Consider θ′ = (b∗i , θ−i).
Then V CGi(θ′) = ri(θ−i).
But then the payment of agent i under mechanism r′ for the profile θ′ is
t′i(θ
′) = V CGi(θ
′)− r′i(θ−i) < V CGi(θ
′)− ri(θ−i) = 0,
which is a contradiction, because r′ is a pay-only mechanism. ✷
Theorem 6.5 Consider the public project problem with equal participation costs. Then for a pay-
only Groves mechanism r, the following are equivalent:
1. r is individually undominated,
2. r is the VCG mechanism,
3. r is collectively undominated.
Proof. 1 → 2. Consider a pay-only and individually undominated Groves mechanism r. We claim
that r is the VCG mechanism.
In the considered domain every agent i, given θ−i, can force his VCG payment to be 0 by
declaring b∗i = c/n. Indeed, we then would have V CGi(c/n, θ−i) = 0. Hence by Lemma 6.4 the
VCG mechanism individually dominates all other pay-only mechanisms. This means that there can
be no other individually undominated mechanism than VCG.
11. This is a slight generalization of the Potential for Universal Relevance Nullification (PURN) condition introduced in
(Cavallo, 2006). An agent satisfies PURN if he can make his payment under the VCG mechanism equal to 0 for any
type vector θ−i of the other agents. Here, the only difference is that we consider all Groves mechanisms instead of
just VCG.
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2→ 3 holds by Theorem 6.2 and 3→ 1 holds by the definition. ✷
The above theorem shows that for the public project problem with equal participation costs,
VCG is the only pay-only Groves mechanism that is individually/collectively undominated. In Ap-
pendix A, we show a similar result for anonymous Groves mechanisms, but only for the case of two
agents. That is, if there are exactly two agents, VCG is the only anonymous Groves mechanism that
is individually/collectively undominated. Further, for n ≥ 3, Herve´ Moulin (private communica-
tion) observed that for public project problems with equal participation costs, the VCG mechanism
is not the only non-deficit Groves mechanism that is collectively undominated.
6.2 The general case
The assumption that we have made so far in the public project problem that each agent’s cost share
is the same may not always be realistic. Indeed, it may be argued that ‘richer’ agents (such as larger
enterprises) should contribute more. Does it matter if we modify the formulation of the problem
appropriately? The answer is ‘yes’. First, let us formalize this version of the problem. We assume
now that each initial utility function is of the form
vi(d, θi) := d(θi − ci),
where for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, ci > 0 and
∑n
i=1 ci = c.
In this setting, ci is the share of the project cost to be financed by agent i. We call the resulting
problem the general public project problem. It is taken from (page 518 Moore, 2006). For this
problem we have only two results, both concerning the individual dominance relation.
Theorem 6.6 In the general public project problem the VCG mechanism individually dominates all
other pay-only Groves mechanisms.
Proof. Note that for any i and any θ−i, agent i can force his VCG payment to be 0 by declaring ci,
since ti(ci, θ−i) = 0. By Lemma 6.4 the proof is complete. ✷
The above theorem cannot be extended to non-deficit Groves mechanisms, as is illustrated by
the following theorem. The theorem below also shows that if there is an individually undominated
mechanism in this setting, it cannot be a pay-only mechanism.
Theorem 6.7 For any n ≥ 3, an instance of the general public project problem with n agents exists
for which the BC mechanism individually dominates the VCG mechanism.
Proof. We will show this for n = 3. For n > 3, it is fairly simple to extend the proof. We omit the
details. The VCG mechanism is non-deficit, hence it suffices to show by Proposition 2.3(ii) that the
VCG and BC mechanisms do not coincide, for some choice of c, c1, c2, c3, with c1 + c2 + c3 = c.
To this end we need to find θ2 and θ3 so that SBCGC1 (θ2, θ3) > 0. Here
SBCGC1 (θ2, θ3) := min
θ′
1
∈Θ1
((R1 +R2 +R3)− L),
where for θ′ := (θ′1, θ2, θ3)
L := (n − 1)
n∑
k=1
vk(f(θ
′), θ′k),
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R1 = max
d∈D
∑
j 6=1
vj(d, θ
′
j) = max{0, θ2 + θ3 − (c2 + c3)},
R2 = max
d∈D
∑
j 6=2
vj(d, θ
′
j) = max{0, θ
′
1 + θ3 − (c1 + c3)},
R3 = max
d∈D
∑
j 6=3
vj(d, θ
′
j) = max{0, θ
′
1 + θ2 − (c1 + c2)}.
Now, take c = 100, c1 = 10, c2 = 40, c3 = 50 and θ2 := 10, θ3 := 70. Then R1 + R2 +R3 =
θ′1 + 10 +max{0, θ
′
1 − 40}. Two cases arise.
Case 1 f(θ′) = 0.
Then L = 0, so (R1 +R2 +R3)− L ≥ 10.
Case 2 f(θ′) = 1.
Then L = 2(θ′1 + θ2 + θ3 − 100) = 2θ′1 − 40, so
(R1 +R2 +R3)− L = 50− θ
′
1 +max{0, θ
′
1 − 40}
≥ (50− θ′1) + (θ
′
1 − 40) ≥ 10.
This proves that SBCGC1 (θ2, θ3) ≥ 10. By taking any θ′1 ∈ [40, 100] we see that in fact
SBCGC1 (θ2, θ3) = 10. ✷
By virtue of Theorem 6.6 the BC mechanism in the above proof is not pay-only.
7. Conclusions and future work
The family of Groves mechanisms, which includes the well-known VCG mechanism (also known
as the Clarke mechanism), is a family of efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms. Unfortunately,
the Groves mechanisms are generally not budget balanced. That is, under such mechanisms, pay-
ments may flow into or out of the system of the agents, resulting in deficits or reduced utilities for
the agents. To identify non-deficit Groves mechanisms that give the agents the highest utilities,
we introduced two general measures for comparing mechanisms in prior-free settings. Specifically,
we say that a non-deficit Groves mechanism M individually dominates another non-deficit Groves
mechanism M ′ if for every type profile, every agent’s utility under M is no less than that under M ′,
and this holds with strict inequality for at least one type profile and one agent. We say that a non-
deficit Groves mechanism M collectively dominates another non-deficit Groves mechanism M ′ if
for every type profile, the agents’ total utility (social welfare) under M is no less than that under
M ′, and this holds with strict inequality for at least one type profile. The above definitions induce
two partial orders on non-deficit Groves mechanisms. This paper mainly focused on studying the
maximal elements corresponding to these two partial orders.
A number of interesting open problems remain. Specifically,
• We provided in Section 4.2 two examples showing that collective undominance is strictly
stronger than individual undominance. One example involves a discrete type space, while the
other example involves discontinuous redistribution functions. It remains to be seen whether
the two definitions of undominance coincide when the type space is smoothly connected and
the redistribution functions are continuous.
31
GUO, MARKAKIS, APT, CONITZER
• We know from (Guo & Conitzer, 2010) that the OEL mechanisms are not the only collectively
undominated mechanisms in multi-unit auctions with unit demand, because there exist prior
distributions under which other mechanisms achieve strictly higher expected social welfare.
That is, for multi-unit auctions with unit demand, there exist other unknown collectively
undominated mechanisms (based on nonlinear redistribution functions). However, it remains
to be seen whether there also exist collectively undominated mechanisms (other than VCG)
for public project problems.
• We proposed two techniques for generating individually undominated mechanisms. Can we
also derive techniques for generating collectively undominated mechanisms?
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Appendix A. Uniqueness of VCG for the case of two agents
Theorem A.1 Consider the public project problem with equal participation costs. When the num-
ber of agents is n = 2, then for a non-deficit, and anonymous Groves mechanism r, the following
are equivalent:
1. r is individually undominated,
2. r is the VCG mechanism,
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3. r is collectively undominated.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 6.5 it suffices to show that 1 → 2. So take a non-deficit,
anonymous, and individually undominated Groves mechanism, determined by the function r.
For x ∈ [0, c], take θ := (x, x). If x ≥ c/2, then the efficient outcome is f(θ) = 1 and no
agent is pivotal, hence the total VCG payment is 0. If x < c/2, then the project is not built and
again no agent is pivotal. Hence in both cases the VCG payment is 0. If t is the payment function
corresponding to r, then we have that t1(θ) + t2(θ) = −2r(x). Since r is non-deficit, we have that
for every x ∈ [0, c], r(x) ≤ 0. But since r is individually undominated, it cannot be the case that
r(x) < 0 for some x, because then the VCG mechanism would dominate r. Hence r coincides with
the VCG mechanism. ✷
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